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South-Eastern Europe has experienced falling or stagnant economic activity in the past 
decade.  One key element of the economic stagnation is a low level of saving and investment.  
These are respectively only one-half and two-thirds of the figure seen in the more successful 
transition economies in Central Europe.  We have chosen to focus this paper on this 
particular issue because it has not received the attention it deserves.  This does not mean that 
the low level of savings and investment is necessarily the determining  factor behind the poor 
economic performance in the region.  Other elements, such as war and civil unrest, are 
clearly also critical. 
 
Any quantitative analysis of South-Eastern Europe’s economies is fraught with difficulties 
that should not be ignored.  The quality of economic data is poor, and gaps in the availability 
of data has often forced us to resort to estimates and assumptions.  Private sector saving, to 
take one example, can only be derived as a residual from the savings-investment equation.  
Published economic data only covers the official economy, sometimes comprising only half 
of all actual economic activity.  Despite these well-known caveats, there is enough available 
data to apply a more systematic approach, and not to rely entirely on anecdotal evidence.  
Large disparities across countries means that generalised conclusions must in the end be 
treated with some caution, but the data on investment and saving does tell a simple and 
consistent story for the region.  This can then serve as a basic framework on which a broader 
and more nuanced discussion on economic development can be built. 
 
The paper is organised as follows:  The next section reviews the recent trends in investment 
rates in South-Eastern Europe (SEE).  The low level of investment in the region emerges 
clearly from this discussion.  To explain the low investment rates, we then look at the other 
side of the savings-investment identity in section 3.  In particular, we split savings into a 
foreign component, a government component, and a domestic private sector component.  The 
key weakness is the poor private sector savings rate.  Indeed, very large capital inflows into 
the region are needed to close the domestic savings-investment gap, even though investment 
is at low levels to begin with.  In the following three sections we discuss the key components 
of savings in turn to see where gains may come from in the future.  We argue that increasing 
corporate retained earnings is the key short to medium term solution.  Some policy measures 
to achieve this goal are briefly outlined
1. 
                                                       
1 For background information, the paper draws on a wide body of analysis on the region produced 
over the past year, including World Bank (1999), Gligorov (1999), EBRD (1999), PlanEcon (1999) 
and EU and World Bank (1999). -- 2 -- 
 
2.  Savings and investment in South-Eastern Europe 
 
Following a sharp initial decline in output at the outset of this decade, many countries in 
South-Eastern Europe have failed to show the kind of rebound observed in the more 
successful transition economies.  GDP in Poland -- the most successful of the transition 
economies, was 20% larger in 1998 than at its previous late-1980s peak.  FR Yugoslavia’s 
economy – at the other end of the spectrum -- stood at less than half its peak one decade ago
2.  
A string of post-disintegration wars in the former Yugoslav republics account for some of the 
economic stagnation in the region, but failure to transform domestic economies and 
institutions are at least of equal importance. 
 
Since they serve as a natural benchmark, it is useful to continue the comparison with the 
better performing transition economies (while always bearing in mind the data issues referred 
to in the introduction).  For the purpose of this discussion, a key feature in the success of this 
latter group has been the strong growth in fixed investment.  In Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which we summarise as the CEEC-6), investment 
has increased as a share of GDP from a relatively low level towards a healthy 28% of GDP 
(PlanEcon, 1999).  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  Domestic savings have also been rising, 
leaving foreign saving (i.e. the current account deficit) at around 4% of GDP in recent years.  
Furthermore, thanks to an overall favourable attitude in these countries towards foreign 
participation in privatisation programmes, foreign direct investment (FDI) has financed more 
than two-thirds of the current account deficit, limiting the accumulation of foreign debt. 
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FDI and foreign ownership of privatised industries have speeded up the restructuring of 
CEEC companies, providing needed know-how, foreign market access and corporate 
governance.  However, it is important to note that FDI, averaging just over 3% of GDP in 
                                                       
2 For a discussion on the economic impact on FR Yugoslavia from the Kosovo conflict, see for 
instance Dinkic, ed. (1999). -- 3 -- 
1996-98, has remained a relatively modest share of investment (EBRD, 1999).   
 
Table 1:  FDI in CEECs
1996-98
USD million 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f % of GDP
Czech Republic 2,500 1,400 1,300 2,500 3,500 3.1
Estonia 199 111 130 575 350 5.8
Hungary 4,500 2,000 1,700 1,500 1,600 3.8
Poland 1,100 2,800 3,000 6,600 6,500 2.9
Slovakia 202 251 177 508 500 1.6
Slovenia 170 178 295 154 na 1.1
CEEC-6 Total 8,987 7,268 7,445 12,978 13,000 3.1
Source: Transition Report, EBRD 1999  
 
 
Admittedly, there are large differences between different CEECs.  Some countries that have 
not encouraged substantial foreign participation in privatisation, such as Slovakia and 
Slovenia, have experienced only limited FDI inflows.  Others, such as the Baltic states, have 
managed to attract FDI equivalent to 5%-7% of GDP.  As a result of the small and extremely 
open nature of these economies, the Baltics have become fertile breeding ground for so 
called “outward processing”; low-cost outsourcing of manufacturing and assembly by 
multinational companies, especially from Sweden and Finland.  The Baltic countries have 
also benefited from their close proximity to their Nordic neighbours, skilled labour forces 
and reasonably functional infrastructure.  It is also important to stress that FDI levels have as 
a rule peaked at the height of privatisation programs.  In early privatisers such as Hungary, 
FDI peaked at 10% of GDP in 1995 and has since fallen to just over 3% of GDP in 1998-99.  
In Estonia, FDI peaked at 11% of GDP in 1998, and has fallen to around 7% of GDP in 
1999.  In countries where privatisation programs were introduced more gradually, FDI 
remain close to peak levels, but the gradual nature of the programs also mean that these 
peaks are lower.  In Poland, for example, FDI stood at just over 4% in 1998 and 1999. 
 
When compared with the more successful transition economies, and indeed with other fast-
growing middle income countries, South-Eastern Europe has a very low investment ratio.  
Aggregate investment in the SEE-7 countries (comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
FR Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) has crept up at a slow 
pace, from around 15% of GDP in early 1990s to about 20% today.  This is some 8 
percentage points below the more advanced Central and Eastern European Countries.  As 
illustrated by table 2, there are substantial differences across the SEE-7 countries.  
Investment stands at around 25% of GDP in Croatia, which is almost in line with other 
CEECs.  Bosnia and Herzegovina also has a very high investment ratio due to substantial 
inflows of international aid.  It seems unlikely that sustained economic growth will be 
achieved unless the region’s investment rate is raised substantially.   
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Table 2: Domestic investment in South-Eastern Europe
Share of GDP, % 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f
Albania 15.0 14.3 9.9 10.0 10.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12.0 19.2 26.1 30.0 35.1
Bulgaria 15.7 13.9 11.8 12.3 13.2
Croatia 18.4 23.9 25.2 24.7 24.7
FR Yugoslavia 13.3 13.1 16.6 16.6 17.4
FYR Macedonia 13.9 13.2 13.3 13.3 14.0
Romania 21.4 21.3 19.2 19.6 19.4
SEE-7 GDP-weighted average 17.9 19.2 19.1 19.3 19.8
Source:  PlanEcon (1999)
Note: Investment as a share of GDP is taken from PlanEcon (1999) with the exception of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an estimate based on tentative data on investment growth 
rates, also from PlanEcon.  
 
 
To find reasons for the low level of investment we can turn to the other side of the national 
accounts identity which states that total investment must equal total savings.  More 
specifically, we can split the sources of finance (savings) into its constituent elements as 
follows:   
 
 
Total    Foreign    Government     Private 
 Investment  =  Saving   +  Saving   +  Saving 
   (current  account   (budget  surplus   (corporate   
    deficit)    plus       and  households) 
       public  investment) 
 
 
This equation states that total investment in the economy must equal total saving, which 
consists of foreign saving (the current account deficit), government saving (the budget 
balance plus public investment) and private saving (corporate profits and household saving). 
 
The government affects the savings-investment equation in two ways.  On the one hand, the 
budget deficit (surplus) decreases (increases) saving by the private sector.  It does this 
through the impact of government borrowing on interest rates.  On the other hand, the 
government itself is responsible for investment.  This includes roads, public buildings such as 
schools and hospitals, and environmental protection (e.g. flood control).
3  Thus, the net 
impact of the government on the investment equation, is equal to the government balance 
plus public investment.  Although budget deficits do exist in the region, they are largely the 
same order of magnitude as public investment (around 4% of GDP) and the net impact has 
remained close to zero for the region as a whole.  The region is, in fact, close to the so-called 
“golden-rule” that governments can borrow to fund investment, but that current expenditures 
should be covered with tax receipts. 
 
Table 3 shows each of these categories of saving for the countries of South-East Europe (see 
also figure 2 for the overview picture of the region).  A first striking feature is the large role 
for foreign saving.  These, equal to the current account deficit, have been around 7% of GDP 
                                                       
3 Note that public investment in this context means strictly investment by the government and its 
agencies, and does not include the investment of companies under government ownership (such as 
railways companies).  -- 5 -- 
in recent years
4, or more than one-third of the total.  The above equation tells us that this 
foreign capital has been needed to fill the large domestic savings-investment gap, even 
though the level of investment has been low to begin with.  
 
Table 3: Breakdown of savings
Share of GDP, % 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f
Albania 15.0 14.3 9.9 10.0 10.5
  Domestic private saving 9.9 12.8 6.3 8.8 4.6
  Government saving -2.1 -7.6 -8.6 -5.2 -8.8
  Foreign saving 7.3 9.1 12.2 6.3 14.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12.0 19.2 26.1 30.0 35.1
  Domestic private saving -0.7 -7.9 -8.1 0.1 11.3
  Government saving 2.4 -0.2 3.2 3.0 4.0
  Foreign saving 10.3 27.3 31.0 26.9 19.8
Bulgaria 15.7 13.9 11.8 12.3 13.2
  Domestic private saving 20.1 24.2 16.4 6.3 4.3
  Government saving -4.9 -9.1 -0.4 3.7 2.9
  Foreign saving 0.5 -1.2 -4.2 2.3 6.0
Croatia 18.4 23.9 25.2 24.7 24.7
  Domestic private saving 8.9 14.6 9.9 12.4 17.1
  Government saving 2.7 4.9 3.3 5.2 1.4
  Foreign saving 6.8 4.4 12.1 7.1 6.2
FR Yugoslavia 13.3 13.1 16.6 16.6 17.4
  Domestic private saving 5.4 12.2 6.0 14.9 19.6
  Government saving -0.1 -7.1 -1.3 -6.4 -11.2
  Foreign saving 8.0 8.0 12.0 8.0 9.0
FYR Macedonia 13.9 13.2 13.3 13.3 14.0
  Domestic private saving 6.3 3.5 2.5 2.8 9.7
  Government saving 1.9 2.4 2.5 1.2 -4.7
  Foreign saving 5.7 7.3 8.3 9.3 9.0
Romania 21.4 21.3 19.2 19.6 19.4
  Domestic private saving 15.2 14.6 13.3 13.8 13.6
  Government saving 1.4 -0.6 -0.3 -2.2 0.3
  Foreign saving 4.9 7.3 6.2 7.9 5.5
SEE-7 GDP-weighted average 17.9 19.2 19.1 19.3 19.8
  Domestic private saving 11.6 13.9 10.2 11.7 13.8
  Government saving 0.7 -1.4 0.3 -0.3 -1.3
  Foreign saving 5.6 6.7 8.6 7.9 7.3
Source:  PlanEcon (1999), EBRD (1999), IMF(1999), Gligorov, V. (1999) and own estimates
Note: Table 3 is compiled from different data sources.  Total savings equals total investment,
which comes from Table 2.  Data on savings are from EBRD (1999) with the exception of data
for FR Yugoslavia, which is estimated on the basis of PlanEcon (1999) and Gligorov (1999)
sources.  Domestic private saving is calculated as a residual from the other data available. In
light of the often poor quality of data used, the table should be used with some caution as to
its precision.  
 
 
                                                       
4 The national accounts tell us that foreign savings must be equal to the current account deficit, 
regardless of the origional purpose for any particular capital inflow.  -- 6 -- 
Figure 2:  Domestic investment and
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The main source of low domestic saving is the third element of the above identity -  low 
private sector saving, both in the form of household saving and corporate profits.  Household 
saving is depressed by declining real income levels and inadequate means of saving and store 
of value.  Macroeconomic instability, including periods of high inflation and steeply negative 
real interest rates, discourage saving through the banking system.  Institutional financial 
sector weaknesses add to these disincentives.  An extreme example is the collapse of the 
pyramid schemes in Albania, which has been accompanied by a decline in private sector 
saving that has yet to recover.  Corporate saving – at least as recorded in company accounts - 
is equally depressed in South-Eastern Europe by the unstable macroeconomic environment 
and the difficult tax and regulatory environment in which companies operate.  Unclear 
property rights make it uncertain who owns future profits, while current profits are often 
siphoned off by high and arbitrary profit taxes. 
 
In the following three sections we look in some more detail at each of the main components 




3.  Foreign savings and the particular role of foreign direct investment 
 
Foreign savings enter a country via foreign borrowing or through equity investments by non-
residents.  Much discussion of South-Eastern  Europe has focused on equity investments and 
on the possibility of increasing foreign direct investment.  This is a natural response to the 
rapidly growing foreign indebtedness of the region.   
 
The level of FDI was in fact slow to take off in South-Eastern Europe, but has risen notably 
in recent years (see Figure 3).  In 1998, FDI rose to over 4% of GDP on average for the SEE--- 7 -- 
6.
5  FDI inflows are expected to moderate towards 3% this year, close to the CEEC average 
seen before.  Table 4 gives more detail at the country level.  Thus, somewhat contrary to 
expectations, FDI inflows to SEE countries are not only as high as the CEEC average, but 
also relatively evenly distributed across countries.  Most SEE countries receive FDI of 
around 2% to 3% of GDP.  The notable exception is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
substantial aid-related FDI in combination with a still very low level of economic activity has 
generated a higher – but also very erratic – ratio of FDI to GDP. 
 
 
Figure 3: The financing of current
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Table 4:  FDI in South-Eastern Europe
1996-98
USD million 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f % of GDP
A l b a n i a 8 99 74 24 54 3 2.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 504 100 60 5.7
Bulgaria 82 100 497 401 700 3.2
Croatia 83 529 346 854 750 2.8
FYR Macedonia 13 12 18 175 30 2.0
Romania 417 263 1,224 2,040 1,345 3.2
SEE-6 Total 684 1,001 2,631 3,615 2,928 3.1
Source: EBRD (1999)  
 
 
It should be possible to encourage higher FDI inflows into the region through accelerated 
privatisation programmes, market liberalisation and strengthened property rights.  However, 
it is unlikely that substantially higher FDI would be a major element in raising the overall 
investment ratio in South-Eastern Europe.  Since current account deficits in SEE countries 
are on average larger than in CEECs (almost double as a percentage of GDP), an increase in 
FDI would be needed merely to limit the accumulation of foreign debt, which is currently 
                                                       
5 FR Yugoslavia is excluded from this figure due to the lack of data. -- 8 -- 
above sustainable levels.  Even if FDI flows were doubled, to 6% of GDP, it is thus not 
certain that this would substantially increase the aggregate level of investment.  
 
It may also be the case that the region is not a particularly attractive location for FDI.  The 
region’s aggregate GDP only amounts to just over 1% of that of the EU, and about 60% of 
this is due to Croatia and Romania.  As domestic markets, the SEE-7 countries do not add up 
to that of Greece alone.  This means that FDI flows to SEE countries may aim at outward 
processing rather than domestic market.  Whether the SEE countries will be able to exploit 
this as well as has been seen in the Baltics (to continue our earlier comparison) is uncertain, 
however.  The SEE countries have both a lower level of human and physical capital and 
greater geographic isolation.  It is interesting to note that even Greece has had difficulty 
attracting FDI outside the tourist industry, due, amongst other factors, to its location and the 
region’s economic fragmentation.   
 
 
4. Public  investment 
 
In an environment of supportive macroeconomic policies, well-selected public infrastructure 
investment raises the return on private investment.  It is not obvious, however, that there is a 
need to increase this type of investment substantially in South-Eastern Europe.  Public 
investment levels in middle-income countries vary from around 3% of GDP in Latin America 
to 6% of GDP in some Asian countries. This variability is also present in the lower-income 
EU countries, ranging from around 3% of GDP in Greece to around 5% of GDP in Portugal.   
 
Averaging around 4%-5% of GDP, public investment in South-Eastern Europe is not low for 
middle income countries, although there are important exceptions to the average.  Several 
years of weak public finances have reduced public investment in Bulgaria to less than 2% of 
GDP, while public investment is substantially higher than the regional average in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina due to the inflow of foreign aid.  Since overall investment levels in South-
Eastern Europe are lower than in comparable countries, the public sector share of total 
investment is very high, in excess of 25%.
6  Although the infrastructure capital stock is on 
average in a poor state following years of economic decline and mismanagement, it is not 
clear that a substantial increase in public investment is justified.  
 
A key issue is how any increased public spending would be funded.
 7  Weak public 
institutions and excessive tax burdens limit the scope for substantially higher government 
revenues.  While there is some scope for reduced expenditures to the military and 
unprofitable state enterprises, it is likely that these cuts would have to be matched by tax cuts 
to discourage widespread tax evasion. 
 
On the other hand, a fiscal expansion (i.e. funding greater investment via a larger budget 
deficit) – something that could be considered appropriate in response to an external shock 
such as the war in Kosovo – may be counter-productive if it undermines confidence in public 
policy.  Government finances in the region are stretched and debt levels are high.  
Monetisation of fiscal deficits in the past raise the likelihood that investors would react 
negatively to excessive fiscal expansion, with the result that foreign and domestic private 
investment is reduced. 
                                                       
6 Those countries with high public investment, such as in East Asia, usually have high levels of total 
investment.  Normally public investment is about 1/6 of the total. 
7 There is also the issue of the rate at which sound projects can be prepared and implemented. -- 9 -- 
 
Foreign aid financing of public investment would avoid an unsustainable fiscal expansion, 
though it is probably only in Kosovo where large volumes of funds will be forthcoming
8.  
However, here there is the different risk of generating an aid dependency.  Large foreign aid 
inflows risk to push up real wages and exchange rates, thus undermining private sector 
competitiveness.  The weak growth of the private sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina despite 
rapid reconstruction of public infrastructure shows that it is important to find an appropriate 
balance between the two. 
 
It follows immediately from this discussion that the alternative approach of increasing private 
savings via a budget surplus is also very limited.  On balance, there appears to be little scope 
for a substantial impact on the national savings-investment relationship by the government. 
 
 
5. Private  investment 
 
5.1. Increasing corporate savings 
 
That leaves private sector investment and savings.  We have already seen that these are 
critically weak at the present time.  What could be done?  Let us look once more for possible 
lessons from the better performing transition economies.  At the outset of the transition 
process, it was widely believed that rapid restructuring of the banking sector was needed to 
channel household savings to investment.  This concern turned out to be somewhat 
misplaced.  In economies where household savings are low and banking systems are 
dysfunctional, one should not expect a massive transfer of savings through traditional 
channels of bank intermediation.  The strong growth in the financing of corporate investment 
was achieved through market reforms such as price and labour market liberalisation and the 
introduction of highly competitive exchange rates.  This tended to raise the profitability of 
the corporate sector, with the exception of some crumbling, permanently unprofitable state 
enterprises.  Lacking any substantial access to bank borrowing, the emerging private sector 
relied primarily on retained earnings to finance investment.
9 
 
The situation of delayed transition in South-Eastern Europe means that the experience of the 
more northerly countries remains relevant.  For the region a strategy aiming to raise 
corporate savings in this way would have to contain a number of key macroeconomic and 
structural measures: 
 
•  Liberalisation and limited government:  One reason for low corporate profitability in 
relatively unreformed transition economies is the excessive and often arbitrary 
intervention by governments.  This includes price controls, high tax rates and regulatory 
obstacles to corporate restructuring.  It is for instance often difficult for companies to 
shed labour when weighted down by excess capacity.  All these factors tend to keep 
profits low or negative.  If authorities subsidise unprofitable enterprises -- for instance 
through the banking system as is often the case – while heavily taxing profitable ones, 
this furthermore generates an incentive for enterprises to remain unprofitable.  Reforms 
                                                       
8 For a more detailed discussion on the financing of reconstruction in Kosovo, see for instance Dixon 
(1999) and EU and World Bank (1999). 
9 In fact corporate profits also play a key role in more advanced economies.  Data for OECD countries 
show that the ratio of retained earnings to corporate investment averages around 3/4.   
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that would simplify the regulatory environment for enterprises and reduce the taxation on 
profits would go a long way in boosting the profitability of the corporate sector. 
 
•  Macroeconomic and fiscal stability:  An environment of macroeconomic stability, 
including sustainable government finances and low inflation, is a key component in 
corporate profitability.  Macroeconomic instability makes liquid assets more vulnerable 
to sudden bursts of inflation, while investment is also discouraged by its more uncertain 
future profitability.   
 
•  Privatisation:  Unclear property rights affect both the level of profitability and the 
incentive to invest.  State enterprises are often not subject to effective corporate 
governance by outside owners.  This means that managers may have little incentive to 
make profits.  Similarly, unclear property rights create disincentives to investment, since 
the beneficiaries of future profits are equally unknown.  Effective external private 
ownership is a key element in establishing corporate governance, and profit-maximising 
behaviour by management that is accountable to the owners. 
 
 
5.2. Developing international market opportunities 
 
Even with the reforms set out above, turning higher profits into corporate investment must be 
motivated by market opportunities, either domestically or abroad.  In South-Eastern Europe, 
there is relatively little of either.  Not only are domestic markets small, but export markets 
are limited due to trade barriers.  Figure 4 illustrates how closed the SEE economies are.  
Economies of such limited size as those in South-Eastern Europe are typically more open 
than large economies.  Again, a comparison with the Baltic countries is appropriate.  Exports 
are equivalent to 50% of GDP in Estonia and 40% of GDP in Lithuania.  While the share of 
exports to GDP is almost as large in FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria, it is substantially lower 
in all of the other SEE countries. 
 
 -- 11 -- 
Figure 4:  Exports as a share of GDP
(1998)















Though the region’s isolation from the rest of Europe can explain some of the low export 
ratios, a striking element is the very low level of economic integration between the SEE 
countries themselves.  Except for a few cases of historically based trade links between FR 
Yugoslavia on the one hand and FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other, 
trade in the region is largely undeveloped (Gligorov et al, 1999).  History plays a key role in 
the low level of regional integration.  As former CMEA countries, Romania and Bulgaria in 
particular diverted much of their trade towards the Soviet Union and other CMEA members.  
Albania and Yugoslavia were less integrated into this framework (EBRD, 1999).  Once 
CMEA trade collapsed in the early 1990s, most of its members redirected their trade towards 
the EU market, instead of trying to develop the small regional market.  Today Albania only 
conducts around one-tenth of its official trade with the region.  In conjunction with its low 
overall trade-to-GDP ratio, this makes official intra-regional trade virtually irrelevant for 
Albania’s economy.  Croatia, another relatively closed economy, conducts around 20% of its 
trade with the region.  Croatia is squeezed between its severed ties with much of the former 
Yugoslavia on the one hand, and its troubled relationship with the EU on the other.  
 
This discussion leads to at least one further policy requirement:  
 
•  Liberalisation of foreign trade:  Since local markets in South-Eastern Europe are small 
and fragmented and offer little scope for supporting the development of a manufacturing 
sector, access to foreign – and in particular EU – export markets is necessary.  It is 
noteworthy that the sectors that dominate the exports of the region are those that 
traditionally run into substantial trade barriers from the EU side:  agricultural products, 
raw materials and relatively low-technology manufacturing such as textiles and footwear.  
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5.3. Investment by utilities 
 
Special attention should also be given to one area of corporate investment where the state is 
particularly implicated.  Utilities (such as railways, energy and water management) should in 
principle be able to finance investment from their own fees or from borrowing backed by 
their own assets and revenue streams.  However, poor management, weak balance sheets, and 
insufficient independence means that many of these companies nevertheless rely on 
government guarantees and budgetary transfers, thus adding to the accumulation of public 
debt.  This means that the progressive restructuring of utilities should be a key element in 
raising the level of investment in South-Eastern Europe.  The resulting enhanced 
infrastructure may have many of the positive effects on the investment behaviour of the 
private sector that is seen for “pure” public investment (e.g. public roads). 
 
In order to boost this type of investment there should be a progressive process whereby these 
utilities are restructured and gain independence from the state.  A key short-term element is 
likely to be tariff adjustments to increase revenues and profitability.  Aiming to increase 
internal financing of infrastructure investment, this strategy is the same as that for the rest of 
the corporate sector.  Indeed, once the long-term financial feasibility of utilities has been 
established, and a sound regulatory environment is in place, private sector involvement in 
these sectors will become feasible.  However, with the exception of telecoms, utilities should 
not be expected to obtain substantial financing through privatisation and FDI for quite some 




The experience of high-growth in CEECs and other emerging market economies does 
strongly suggest that higher saving and investment ratios are key to successful economic 
development in South-Eastern Europe.  However, not all components of saving can be 
expected to rise markedly from current levels.  At around 7% of GDP, foreign saving is 
stretched to the limit and higher FDI inflows are required only to change the composition of 
capital inflows rather than to increase them.  Raising domestic saving is also associated with 
limitations.  Weak government finances and the need to reduce tax rates further means that 
the scope for much higher government saving is limited.  At the same time, high 
unemployment rates and low income levels limit the scope for increased household savings, 
at least in the short term.  Macroeconomic uncertainty and the absence of functioning 
financial intermediation also limits the scope for channelling household saving to corporate 
investment.  Weak property rights and weak accounting standards make it nearly impossible 
to assess credit risk, which is a key factor behind the region-wide lack of effective financial 
intermediation. 
 
The best means of raising private saving and investment levels in this environment is to raise 
corporate profitability.  Corporate saving -- the internal financing of corporate investment 
from retained earnings – overcomes the problem of low household saving rates, 
dysfunctional financial intermediation and lack of credit risk information.  In the highly 
diverse “region” of South-Eastern Europe, post-war reconstruction programs similar to that 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina are likely to be the exception rather than the rule.  Aid-financed 
reconstruction of housing and infrastructure reconstruction may be a necessary requirement 
for restoring some sense of economic normality in war-torn Kosovo. The rest of the region, 
however, needs to make progress on structural reforms rather than aid inspired public 
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